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The Internal Corporate Investigation
Thomas R. Mulroy & Eric J. Mufloz 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Internal corporate investigations have become an established re-
sponse to allegations of improprieties on the part of the corporation,
its officers, or its employees. A corporation may initiate an internal
investigation in response to an ongoing government investigation or
agency subpoena, pursuant to a consent decree with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), or
another government agency. An investigation may also be prompted
internally, through either a complaint or grievance from an employee
or group of employees. Regardless of whether the investigation be-
gins from inside or outside the organization, the corporation has a sig-
nificant interest in protecting the confidentiality of counsel's findings
and the investigative file. As company managers can appreciate, dis-
closure of non-public corporate information can lead to unforeseen
and undesirable third-party actions, criminal prosecutions, or civil en-
forcement actions by government agencies against the corporation.
Thus, the results of an investigation conducted as part of a good faith
effort to respond to, investigate, and resolve an internal company
problem could provide a road map for an adversary to establish civil
or criminal liability of the corporation, its officers, or its directors. In
today's complex business and regulatory environment, such an occur-
rence is one that every CEO can appreciate and, most critically, will
want to avoid.
1. In January 2001, Mr. Mulroy, University of Santa Clara, California (B.A. 1968), Loyola
University School of Law (J.D. 1972), left the partnership of Jenner & Block to found Mulroy
Scandaglia Marrinson Ryan, a Chicago-based litigation boutique specializing in complex com-
mercial litigation. Mr. Mulroy is a fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers, has lectured
on trial practice at Northwestern, Loyola, and DePaul Schools of Law, and has written exten-
sively on trial issues such as expert witnesses, evidence, simulated juries and cross-examination.
Mr. Mufioz, Stanford University (B.A. 1992), University of Iowa College of Law (J.D. 1999), is
an associate with Mulroy Scandaglia Marrinson Ryan, and concentrates in commercial litigation
and appeals. Mr. Mufioz served as law clerk to the Hon. Robert W. Pratt, U.S. District Court,
Southern District of Iowa, from 1999-2001. The authors wish to acknowledge W. Joseph Thes-
ing, Jr., who co-authored an earlier version of this article, Confidentiality Concerns in Internal
Corporate Investigations, 25 TORT & INS. L. J. 48 (1989).
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In light of the potential problems that can occur in the context of an
internal investigation, corporate counsel - whether drawn from in-
house or hired from the outside - should seek to minimize corporate
exposure to adverse proceedings. To that end, the corporation and its
counsel must be active in structuring the investigation so as to take
full advantage of the protections of the attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine. Maximizing the protections afforded by
the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, while at the
same time minimizing the potential hazards that may arise during an
investigation, should be a principal goal of counsel in overseeing any
serious internal investigation.
II. BACKGROUND
An integral part of analyzing an internal corporate investigation is
to first establish a clear understanding of the legal protections that are
likely to be involved. Part A examines the characteristics of the attor-
ney-client privilege. 2 Part B analyzes the components of the work
product doctrine.3
A. Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications
between an individual and his/her attorney. It has been noted that the
attorney-client privilege "interferes with the truth seeking mission of
the legal process," and therefore is not "favored."'4 The Supreme
Court, however, has expressly recognized that the attorney-client priv-
ilege enjoys a special position as "the oldest of the privileges for confi-
dential communications known to the common law," and that the
privilege serves a salutary and important purpose, "[to] encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice."'5
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1389 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1239 (1997); see also United States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1205 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 931 (1996) (commenting that the privilege operates to "withhold[ ] relevant information
from the fact finder") (citation and internal quotations omitted); Myers v. Uniroyal Chem. Co.,
Inc., No. CIV.A.916716, 1992 WL 97822, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1992) ("Privileges in litigation
are not favored.") (citing Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979)). See generally Elizabeth
G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157 (1993) (critiquing theory behind attorney- client privilege).
5. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
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Where the client is a corporation, the application of this privilege
becomes slightly more complicated. In general, a corporation is enti-
tled to the same protection of confidentiality that individual clients
receive under the attorney-client privilege. 6 The difficulty in applying
the privilege in the corporate context arises from the inanimate nature
of a corporation, which can only "speak" to its attorney through its
agents.7 Yet it is clear that the corporation's lawyer represents not
individual agents but the corporation and thus, application of the at-
torney-client privilege often turns on which corporate officials and
employees sufficiently personify the corporate entity as a client.8
1. Essential Elements of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The essential elements of the privilege are contained in Judge
Wyzanski's widely-cited opinion in United States v. United Shoe Ma-
chinery Corp.9 The privilege applies if: (1) the person asserting the
privilege is or seeks to become a client; (2) the person to whom the
communication was made is an attorney or his subordinate, acting in
his capacity as an attorney with respect to the communication; (3) the
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed by
the client in confidence; (4) the communication relates to the seeking
of legal advice or assistance and is not for the purpose of committing a
crime or tort; and (5) the privilege has been claimed and not waived. 10
The burden is on the proponent to demonstrate that the attorney-
client privilege applies.11 If that party demonstrates its applicability,
then communications between attorney and client, absent waiver, will
receive absolute and complete protection from disclosure. 12 How-
ever, transferring these requirements into the corporate context poses
a significant challenge.
2. Defining Client in the Corporate Context
a. Corporate Employees With Relevant Information
Upjohn Co. v. United States13 is the starting point for determining
who the client is in the corporate context. As explained below,
Upjohn is notable for its holding with respect to the applicability of
6. Id. at 389-90.
7. See id. at 390.
8. See id. at 391-92.
9. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
10. Id. at 358-59; see also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
11. See United States v. Stern, 511 F.2d 1364, 1367 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 829
(1975).
12. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 102 F.3d 748, 750 (4th Cir. 1996).
13. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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the attorney-client privilege in connection with an internal corporate
investigation.
In Upjohn, independent accountants, conducting an audit for the
Upjohn Company, informed the company's in-house general counsel
that certain improper payments had been made to foreign government
officials to win government business.' 4 The general counsel, outside
counsel, and the Chairman of the Board decided to conduct an inter-
nal investigation of the matter.1 5
As part of this investigation, Upjohn's attorneys sent a letter con-
taining a questionnaire to all of its foreign managers.' 6 The letter,
signed by Upjohn's Chairman, stated that the company's general
counsel was conducting an investigation into the matter and that man-
agement needed full information concerning any possible illegal pay-
ments.1 7 The enclosed questionnaire sought detailed information
concerning such payments, and the responses were to be sent directly
to the general counsel.' 8 Recipients of the questionnaire were in-
structed "to treat the investigation as 'highly confidential' and not to
discuss it with any one, other than Upjohn employees, who might be
helpful in providing the requested information."' 9 Upjohn's attorneys
kept the responses confidential.20 Upjohn's general counsel and
outside counsel also interviewed these managers and some thirty-
three other Upjohn officers or employees. 21
The company voluntarily submitted a preliminary report to both the
SEC and the IRS.22 The IRS later sought all the files relating to the
investigation, including the written questionnaires, and notes and
memoranda of counsel-employee interviews.2 3 Upjohn objected to
the production of these materials on attorney-client privilege and
work product grounds.24
In deciding to apply the privilege to the communications of lower-
level managers, the Court rejected the "control group" test, under
which only those communications between counsel and upper-echelon
(or "control group") management would be privileged.25 The court
14. Id. at 386.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 387.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 387.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 387-88.
24. Id. at 388 (arguing that the materials were prepared in "anticipation of litigation").
25. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 388.
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observed that, in the context of rendering legal advice to a corpora-
tion concerning actual or potential difficulties, it is natural for counsel
to obtain "relevant information" from not only "control group" em-
ployees, but "[m]iddle-level - and indeed lower-level - employees" as
well.2 6 Citing the purpose behind the privilege - namely, "full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients" - the Court
rejected the "narrow" control group test and held that such a test,
"cannot, consistent with the principles of the common law,... govern
the development of the law in this area."27
Upjohn gives broad protection to the confidential communications
of any corporate employee - not just control group members - who,
during a legal investigation, supplies relevant information to corporate
counsel. 28 In Upjohn, the following factors supported application of
the privilege: (1) the interviews occurred at the direction of corporate
counsel; (2) employee communications were made to corporate coun-
sel acting as such; (3) the information sought was not available from
"control group" management; (4) the communications were within the
scope of the employees' duties; and (5) the employees were aware
that they were being questioned in order for the corporation to secure
legal advice.29 Although lower federal courts have not required all of
the Upjohn factors to be present before finding certain communica-
tions privileged, 30 counsel would be well to emulate as many of these
Upjohn factors as possible in order to maximize the chances that a
court will find investigative files privileged.
Although Upjohn ultimately applied the privilege to communica-
tions between counsel and lower-level corporate employees, its hold-
ing is not universally followed and the opinion is still the subject of
much interpretation, especially in federal diversity cases and state
court litigation.
b. Limits
There are some limitations to the Upjohn decision that should be
noted. First, the holding in Upjohn is grounded in the federal com-
mon law of attorney-client privilege. 31 In other words, Upjohn will
26. Id. at 391.
27. Id. at 389, 397 (citing FED. R. EVID. 501).
28. See id.
29. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 384.
30. See, e.g., Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc. v. Lemay, 89 F.R.D. 410, 412-14 (S.D. Ohio 1981)
(privilege upheld where communications made outside scope of employee's duties); Leucadia,
Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 101 F.R.D. 674, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (privilege upheld where communi-
cation made without expectation of confidentiality).
31. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383.
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apply in federal question cases that use federal common law to decide
privilege questions. 32 However, Upjohn may not necessarily apply in
diversity proceedings where the federal court, in deciding privilege
questions, is obligated to use state privilege law, which could vary
from state to state.33
Second, the ruling in Upjohn is not binding upon state courts. In
fact, according to one recent survey, only fourteen states (either
through judicial decision or legislative enactment) have adopted
Upjohn's rule on corporate attorney-client privilege, eight states have
adopted the "control group" test, and the remaining states have not
definitively decided on a particular approach. 34 Thus, if attorney-cli-
ent questions in the corporate context are litigated in state court,
counsel should consult the relevant state's law on attorney-client privi-
lege to determine the applicable privilege standard.
32. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) ("Questions of privilege that arise in
the course of the adjudication of federal rights are 'governed by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience."') (citing FED. R. EvID. 501); In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 1994)
(applying "the federal common law of attorney client privilege" to civil RICO action).
33. That Upjohn's federal common law holding on privilege is circumscribed by state law
flows from Federal Rule of Evidence 501, the rule upon which the Upjohn holding was premised.
Rule 501 provides that in civil actions and proceedings where state law supplies the substantive
rule of decision (i.e., most diversity litigation) the privilege of a witness "shall be determined in
accordance with State law." In all other cases (as happened in Upjohn where a federal tax
provision was at issue), Rule 501 provides that the privilege of a witness "shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States
in the light of reason and experience." See generally Sherman L. Cohn, The Organizational Cli-
ent: Attorney-Client Privilege and the No-Contact Rule, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 755-60
(1997); James Heckmann, Evidence-Upjohn v. United States -Corporate Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, 7 J. CORP. L. 359, 370-71 (1982).
34. Brian E. Hamilton, Conflict, Disparity, and Indecision: The Unsettled Corporate Attorney-
Client Privilege, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 629, 633-40 (1997) (noting that the fourteen states
adopting some version of Upjohn's expansive reading of the corporate attorney-client privilege
are: Alabama (ALA. R. EVID. 502(a)(2)); Arizona (ARiz. REV. STAT. § 12-2234 (West 2002));
Arkansas (Courteau v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 821 S.W.2d 45 (Ark. 1991)); California
(D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 388 P.2d 700 (Cal. 1964) (en banc)); Colorado (Den-
ver Post Corp. v. Univ. of Colo., 739 P.2d 874 (Colo. 1987)); Florida (Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1994)); Kentucky (Ky. R. EVID. 503(a)(2)); Louisiana (LA.
CODE EVID. ANN. art. 506(a)(2) (West 2002)); Mississippi (Miss. R. EViD. 502(a)(2)); Nevada
(Wardleigh v. Dist. Court, 891 P.2d 1180 (Nev. 1995)); Oregon (OR. EVID. CODE R. 503(1)(d)
(2002)); Texas (TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 503(a)(2)); Utah (UTAH R. EVID. 504(a)(4)); Vermont (Bais-
ley v. Missisquoi Cemetery Ass'n, 708 A.2d 924 (Vt. 1998). The eight states rejecting Upjohn and
adopting the narrow control group standard for corporate attorney-client privilege are: Alaska
(ALASKA R. EVID. 503 (a)(2)); Hawaii (HAw. R. EVID. 503(a)(2)); Illinois (Consolidated Coal
Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1982)); Maine (ME. R. EvID. 502(a)(2)); New
Hampshire (N.H. R. EVID. 502(a)(2)); North Dakota (N.D. R. EVID. 502(a)(2)); Oklahoma
(OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2502(A)(4) (West 2002)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-
13-2(2) (Michie 2002)). See Hamilton, supra, at 640.
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c. Former Employees
There is authority for the proposition that former corporate em-
ployees who, during the course of an investigation, communicate with
corporate counsel about a matter within that former employee's scope
of employment, will also enjoy the protections of the attorney-client
privilege. 35 In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated that
a former employee's communications are privileged when the em-
ployee "speaks at the direction of the management with an attorney
regarding conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of employ-
ment."' 36 Many lower federal courts have endorsed this view and
found communications between corporate counsel and former em-
ployees to be privileged. 37 Although protection for the communica-
tions of former employees reflects a majority view in the law, there is
contrary authority grounded in state law.38 Of course, as is the case
with any issue, counsel litigating former-employee questions should
research the law of the relevant jurisdiction to determine the applica-
bility of the attorney-client privilege to former employees.
3. Communications With An Attorney
The protections of the attorney-client privilege extend to communi-
cations with an attorney's agent only if the attorney is using the agent
to facilitate the rendering of legal advice and the agent is acting under
the direct supervision of the attorney.39 Communications from agents,
not acting pursuant to direction from counsel, will likely not be held as
35. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 403 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
36. Id.
37. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings In Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig., 658 F.2d
1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982) (The Upjohn "rationale applies to
the ex-employees... involved in this case. Former employees, as well as current employees, may
possess the relevant information needed by corporate counsel to advise the client"); Admiral
Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 881 F.2d 1486, 1493 (9th Cir. 1989); Porter v. Arco Metals
Co., 642 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 (D. Mont. 1986) (Upjohn indicates that "the attorney-client privi-
lege may extend to [defendant's] former employees .. .[with regard to their communications
with] the company's counsel."); United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253, 259 (C.D. Cal. 1982)
("[An attorney-client] relationship existed even though [the witness] was not an employee of
[the client] at the time of the conversation."), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
Zolin, 842 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1988); Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36,
41 (D. Mass. 1987) ("In some circumstances, the communications between a former employee
and a corporate party's counsel may be privileged.").
38. See, e.g., Barrett Indus. Trucks, Inc. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 515, 517-18 (N.D.
I11. 1990); Connolly Data Sys., Inc. v. Victor Techs., Inc., 114 F.R.D. 89, 93-94 (S.D. Cal. 1987).
39. See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1335-37 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 833 (1979) (involving an investigator employed by co-defendant's counsel); United States v.
Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 143-44 (8th Cir. 1972) (addressing whether the privilege prohibits disclosure
of working papers and memoranda prepared by accountant employed by attorney for the pur-
pose of rendering legal advice).
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privileged. 40  Generally, corporate communications with either in-
house or outside counsel are treated the same for purposes of the at-
torney-client privilege. 41
In addition, if a corporation hires a specially-appointed counsel,
pursuant to a consent decree with the SEC, to investigate and formu-
late legal advice, all materials are privileged. 42 However, the privilege
will not apply if such counsel is hired mainly to investigate and report
to the board of directors, or as one court put it, if special counsel is
engaged "not for their legal acumen but for their skill as
investigators. '43
These protections are significant in the context of internal corporate
investigations because counsel, in order to gather, analyze, and assess
the facts and legal implications of an investigation, will frequently re-
quire assistance from accountants, investigators, and other attorneys.
As the next section bears out, merely being a "lawyer" will not auto-
matically render communications to and from the corporate client as
privileged.44 Rather, counsel and his/her agent must be acting princi-
pally as a lawyer.45 In order to qualify for the privilege, a lawyer must,
at a minimum, be involved not only in investigating the facts, but also
in formulating and rendering legal advice and opinion.46 Communica-
tions that only incidentally implicate counsel's legal judgment and ad-
vice will generally not be shielded under the attorney-client
privilege. 47
40. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 220 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2000) (preparation of tax
return is an accounting service, not the provision of legal advice; but "information transmitted to
an attorney or to the attorney's agent is privileged if it was not intended for subsequent appear-
ance on a tax return and was given to the attorney for the sole purpose of seeking legal advice");
United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038, 1039-40 (7th Cir. 1973) (accountant's notes of conversa-
tion with client and attorney not privileged because client retained accountant and instructed
him to attend meeting); see also United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984)
(no accountant-client privilege exists under federal law for accountants acting as agents of a
corporation).
41. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950).
42. See In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 600 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
43. Osterneck v. E. T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 82 F.R.D. 81, 85 (N.D. Ga. 1979); see also Securi-
ties & Exch. Comm'n v. Canadian Javelin Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 594, 596 (D.D.C. 1978), vacated on
other grounds by No. 76-2070, 1978 WL 1139, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 1978) (privilege did not
attach to communications of special counsel who was appointed not to offer corporation advice,
but to "monitor and report on" corporation's compliance with a court injunction).
44. See, e.g., infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., infra note 56 and accompanying text.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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4. Communications For the Purpose of Seeking Legal Advice
A corollary to the requirement that communications be made to an
attorney or his/her agent is that such communications be made for the
purpose of seeking legal advice. 48 The attorney-client privilege does
not cover communications that are made for non-legal purposes.49
For example, if corporate counsel acts as a business and not a legal
adviser, the attorney-client privilege does not apply.50 Moreover, if
both a corporation and its counsel prepare a document for review,
without a clear legal aim, it may not be privileged.51 The privilege will
not apply if a lawyer is hired solely as an accountant, 52 or when the
lawyer acts as a negotiator or business agent. 53 On the other hand,
some courts have held that, despite their technical nature, the attor-
ney-client privilege does protect communications between an inventor
and his patent attorney.54
In practice, corporate counsel wears many hats - advising and as-
sisting the corporation with financial, business, technical, or human
resource issues. Neither the corporation nor its counsel should have
to forfeit the privilege because counsel has additional non-legal re-
sponsibilities. Judge Wyzanski made this point clear in an oft-quoted
passage:
The modern lawyer almost invariably advises his client upon not
only what is permissible but also what is desirable. And it is in
48. See In re Diasonics Sec. Litig., 110 F.R.D. 570, 573 (D. Colo. 1986).
49. See id. (noting that the attorney-client privilege applies only to communications requesting
legal advice made to an attorney by a client requesting legal advice).
50. See, e.g., In re Feldberg, 862 F. 2d 622, 627 (7th Cir. 1988); In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94,
99 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d
1032, 1037 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Diasonics Sec. Litig., 110 F.R.D. at 573; North Carolina Elec.
Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 110 F.R.D. 511, 517 (M.D.N.C. 1986); Securi-
ties & Exch. Comm'n v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 683 (D.D.C. 1981).
51. See FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 212-13 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (credit reporting company
and its counsel hired research group to put technical information concerning the company's com-
puterized credit reporting system into a form that lawyers could understand; study held not privi-
leged because its legal purpose was not clear).
52. See In Re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
53. See J. P. Foley & Co., Inc. v. Vanderbilt, 65 F.R.D. 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
54. See In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 805-06 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding
that "an invention record constitutes a privileged communication, as long as it is provided to an
attorney for the purpose of securing primarily legal opinion, or legal services, or assistance in a
legal proceeding") (citation and internal quotations omitted); see also Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S.
379, 383 (1963) ("[T]he preparation and prosecution of patent applications for others constitutes
the practice of law."). But see Spalding Sports, 203 F.3d at 806 n.3 (noting contrary lower court
authority, including: Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 50 F.R.D. 225, 228 (N.D. Cal. 1970);
Howes v. Med. Components, Inc., No. CIV.A.84-4435, 1988 WL 15191, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23,
1988); Detection Sys., Inc. v. Pittway Corp., 96 F.R.D. 152, 155 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Sneider v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 91 F.R.D. 1, 5 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Choat v. Rome Indus., Inc., 462 F. Supp.
728, 732 (N.D. Ga. 1978)).
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the.. .public interest that the lawyer should regard himself as more
than predictor of legal consequences. His duty to society as well as
to his client involves many relevant social, economic, political and
philosophical considerations. And the privilege of nondisclosure is
not lost merely because relevant nonlegal considerations are ex-
pressly stated in a communication which also includes legal
advice. 55
However, in the context of an internal investigation, corporate coun-
sel must always keep in mind, regardless of the nature of their work,
that their participation in a project must be seen chiefly as a provider
of legal advice to the corporation. To the extent this is done and can
be proven, corporate counsel will be in a much stronger position for
asserting privilege as to communications and other investigative mate-
rial which, although embodying factual and non-legal information, has
as its main purpose the rendering of legal advice. Thus, despite the
myriad of case law both upholding and rejecting privilege claims in the
investigative context, counsel would be well to maintain and docu-
ment its relationship with the corporate client during an investigation
that is marked by traditional norms of seeking and rendering legal
advice. This core principle - namely that investigative material that is
the product of an attorney-client relationship should be protected - is
embodied in the unanimous Upjohn opinion, as well as other federal
court opinions.56
The courts, cognizant that the attorney-client privilege operates as a
truth-sheltering device, will construe the privilege strictly. Assertions
of the privilege where proof of legal advice is tenuous or ambiguous
are often rejected. For example, in Federal Trade Commission v.
TRW, Inc., counsel for a credit reporting company (TRW), in anticipa-
tion of a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigation, hired an
55. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950).
56. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-91 (1981) (the privilege rests on the
need for counsel to "know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation"; the
privilege exists not just to protect the giving of legal advice, but "also the giving of information
to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice"; the "first step in the resolution
of any legal problem is ascertaining the factual background and sifting through the facts with an
eye to the legally relevant"); United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1996) (Upjohn
"make[s] clear that fact- finding which pertains to legal advice counts as 'professional legal ser-
vices"') (citation omitted); In re Woolworth Corp. Sec. Class Action Litig., No. 94-CIV.2217
(RO), 1996 WL 306576, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1996) (investigative notes and memoranda
from law firm hired by company under investigation by the SEC held privileged under Upjohn);
United States v. Davis, 131 F.R.D. 391, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), reh'g granted on procedural matter,
131 F.R.D. 427 (S.D.N.Y. July 02, 1990) (the privilege "encompasses factual investigations by
counsel"); see also In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 603 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the legal theory that
the attorney-client privilege did not apply simply because lawyer's assigned duties were investi-
gative in nature, court found privilege applicable because investigation was "related to the rendi-
tion of legal services") (citation omitted).
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outside research firm for the ostensible purpose of putting technical
information concerning TRW's computerized credit reporting system
into a form that lawyers could understand.57 Although the proposal
indicated that the research firm was hired "to advise TRW ... on the
status of its procedures under the Fair Credit Reporting Act," the
court ultimately rejected TRW's assertion of attorney-client privilege
because of an inadequate showing that the privilege requirements
were met.58
5. Self-Evaluative Privilege
Despite judicial reluctance to fashion new privileges,59 some lower
courts have adopted a so-called "self-evaluative" or "self-critical anal-
ysis" privilege.60 First announced in the 1970 case, Bredice v. Doctors
Hosp. Inc.,61 the self-evaluation privilege is designed to encourage
parties to "engage in candid self-evaluation without fear that such crit-
icism will later be used against them."' 62 It is an elusive privilege, and
one not broadly recognized by the courts. The self-evaluation privi-
lege has been applied in hospital contexts,63 employment discrimina-
tion cases,64 government-obligated reports,65 and in environmental
57. Federal Trade Commission v. TRW, 628 F.2d at 212-13.
58. See id.; see also Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 917 (1987) (aggregate risk management documents, although based on privileged materials,
were themselves not privileged because they were prepared mostly for business purposes);
United States v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 206, 212-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (although the
process of giving legal advice involves incorporating "relevant nonlegal considerations," no priv-
ilege will attach if a document was prepared for purposes of simultaneous review by legal and
non-legal personnel; in such a case, "it cannot be said that the primary purpose of the document
is to secure legal advice") (citation omitted).
59. See generally University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) (acknowledging its authority
to develop privilege rules under Rule 501, the court refused to create a new privilege against the
disclosure of peer review materials).
60. See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5431, at 835
(Supp. 2002) (collecting cases).
61. Bredice v. Doctors Hosp. Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), affd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (minutes of hospital staff meetings regarding procedures to improve patient care could be
protected from discovery in a malpractice suit because of the important public interest in having
hospitals critically evaluate the quality of the care they provide).
62. Reich v. Hercules, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 367, 371 (D.N.J. 1994).
63. See Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 249.
64. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United Telecomms., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 440, 443 (D. Kan. 1987) (statisti-
cal analysis regarding the compensation structure of defendant-employer's work force held privi-
leged in a discrimination case). But see Zapata v. IBP, Inc., No. CIV.A.93-2366-EEO, 1994 WL
649322 (D. Kan. Nov. 10, 1994) (offering a compelling argument that such material in the em-
ployment discrimination context should not be protected).
65. See, e.g., Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678, 684 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (privilege protects
"only those evaluations that the law requires one to make").
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litigation. 66 Because some courts have invoked its protections, the
self-evaluation privilege may serve an important alternative argument
in support of non-disclosure of sensitive intra-corporate files.
In general, the party asserting the privilege must demonstrate that
the material to be protected satisfies at least three criteria: (1) the
information must result from a critical self-analysis undertaken by the
party seeking protection; (2) the public must have a strong interest in
preserving the free flow of the type of information sought; and (3) the
information must be of the type whose flow would be curtailed if dis-
covery were allowed. 67 In addition to these basic requirements, self-
evaluative material must have been prepared with the expectation
that it would be kept confidential and it must, in fact, have been
confidential. 68
6. Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is intended to encourage the client to
share, with his/her attorney, information that is otherwise confiden-
tial.69 When this privilege is waived, it is said that communications
revealed to third parties lose their confidential nature, 70 or reflect a
client's lack of intent to keep matters confidential. 71 In the interests
of fairness and in furtherance of the adversarial system of justice,
some communications may lose their privilege. 72
Waiver of the attorney-client privilege is an important notion, espe-
cially in the context of internal company investigations. In its attempt
to investigate and resolve misfeasance, the corporation, with the assis-
66. See Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 527 (N.D. Fla. 1994) (land-
owner was entitled to qualified privilege for environmental reports prepared after the fact for
"purpose of candid self-evaluation and analysis of cause and effect of past pollution").
67. See Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 425-26 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing
Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (1983)); In re Salomon
Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 91 CIV.5442 (RPP), 91 CIV.5471 (RPP), 1992 WL 350762, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (adopting the privilege but refusing to apply it to management control studies and internal
audit reports because such material is not of the type whose flow would be curtailed if discovery
were allowed).
68. Dowling, 971 F.2d at 426.
69. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981).
70. See Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 644-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
71. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1424 (3d Cir.
1991); In re Consol. Litig. Concerning Int'l Harvester's Disposition of Wis. Steel, 666 F. Supp.
1148, 1157 (N.D. Ill. 1987) ("third party disclosures here further indicate that IH did not intend
attorney-client communication ... to remain confidential"); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2326, at
633 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
72. See In re Bairnco Corp. Sec. Litig., 148 F.R.D. 91, 99-100 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Commonwealth
of Va. v. Edwards, 370 S.E.2d 296, 301 (Va. 1988) (when a party's conduct "touches a certain
point of disclosure, fairness requires that [the] privilege shall cease whether [the party] intended
that result or not").
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tance of its counsel, may invariably find itself making limited disclo-
sures of internal investigations to the government, a court, the public,
or third parties. Good faith disclosures to a government agency could,
for example, end up in the hands of opposing counsel in a subsequent
civil matter, thus forcing the corporation and its counsel to defend
against assertions that the privilege was waived. There are several
common ways in which the privilege can be waived:
a. Disclosure to Third Parties
The basic rule is that attorney-client communications that are dis-
closed to third parties, not for the purpose of assisting the attorney in
rendering legal advice, lose their privilege.73 Privilege-waiving disclo-
sures to third parties can arise in a number of contexts, including dis-
closure of materials to: a client's underwriter and accountant;74 a
corporation's investment banker;75 one's adversary in separate litiga-
tion,76 even if under a confidentiality agreement; 77 and a witness in
preparation for testimony.78
It should be noted that if counsel shares privileged information with
a third party for the purpose of preparing a joint or common defense,
then the privilege generally is not waived.79 The so-called "joint de-
fense" theory may allow counsel conducting an internal corporate in-
vestigation to disclose privileged communications to present and
former employees, or other co-defendants and their attorneys, with-
73. In re Consol. Litig. Concerning Int'l Harvester's Disposition of Wis. Steel, 666 F. Supp. at
1156-57.
74. See In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982) (sharing portions of internal com-
pany investigation with accountant to resolve audit issues and with underwriter in connection
with public offering waived attorney-client privilege and thus investigative materials could be
produced to government); see also United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 540 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944 (1984) (finding that disclosure of tax pool analysis and underly-
ing documentation to outside accountants for tax audit purposes waives attorney-client privi-
lege); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 80-82 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973)
(holding that privilege was waived on disclosure to accountant).
75. SEC v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 96,945
(D.D.C. Aug. 03, 1979) (privilege waived on disclosure to investment banker to secure an inde-
pendent, arm's-length opinion) (citation omitted).
76. Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. Nat'l Bank of Wash., 103 F.R.D. 52, 67 (D.D.C. 1984).
77. See Bowne of N.Y. City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
("[E]ven if the disclosing party requires, as a condition of disclosure, that the recipient maintain
the materials in confidence, this agreement does not prevent the disclosure from constituting a
waiver of the privilege; it merely obligates the recipient to comply with the terms of any confi-
dentiality agreement.") (citations omitted).
78. See Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 384, 397 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (concluding
that "communications from counsel to a testifying expert are discoverable to the extent that they
relate to matters about which the expert will testify").
79. See Sobol v. E.P. Dutton, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 99, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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out sacrificing the confidentiality protections of the attorney-client
privilege.80 As one court explained it, the joint defense privilege is
meant to recognize "the advantages of, and even, the necessity for, an
exchange or pooling of information between attorneys representing
parties sharing such a common interest in litigation, actual or
prospective. '" 81
b. Disclosure to a Government Agency
Waiver issues frequently arise in connection with the disclosure of
investigative materials to government agencies such as the SEC, IRS,
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In this context, a
corporation must confront two issues: (1) whether the attorney-client
privilege has been waived and (2) if waiver has occurred, whether dis-
closure of part of a privileged communication results in a waiver not
only as to matters actually disclosed, but also to all other communica-
tions regarding the same subject matter. 82 Currently, there is a signifi-
cant and widely recognized split among the federal courts as to
whether disclosure of sensitive investigative information should result
in a limited waiver (of material actually disclosed) or a broad waiver
(of potentially every document related to the same subject matter of
those materials actually disclosed). 83
i. Limited Waiver Theory
The Eighth Circuit's en banc decision in Diversified Industries v.
Meredith,8 4 is a leading and widely cited case for the proposition that
disclosure of investigative material to a federal agency should only re-
sult in a limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege. In Diversified
Industries, the court held that compelled disclosure to the SEC of a
corporate report describing a "slush fund" amounted to only a limited
80. See In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1986)
(requiring the party asserting the privilege to show that "(1) the communications were made in
the course of a joint defense effort, (2) the statements were designed to further the effort, and
(3) the privilege has not been waived") (citation omitted); Sobol, 112 F.R.D. at 104 (disclosure
to a former employee, for purpose of preparing common defense, does not waive privilege);
Schachar v. American Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 187, 191 (N.D. I11. 1985).
81. Transmirra Prods. Corp. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 26 F.R.D. 572, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
82. See, e.g., First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 110 F.R.D.
557, 567-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broad. Co., 521
F. Supp. 638, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146,
1161-62 (D.S.C. 1974).
83. See infra notes 84-112 and accompanying text; see also Brian M. Smith, Be Careful How
You Use It or You May Lose It: A Modern Look at Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege and the
Ease of Waiver in Various Circuits, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 389, 402-10 (1998).
84. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
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waiver of the attorney-client privilege - limited in that the privilege
would be deemed waived as to the government, but not as to private
third parties.85 The court refused to order the corporation to produce
the report for inspection to private plaintiffs in pending civil litigation
on the grounds that a contrary ruling could undermine corporate in-
centives to initiate counsel-conducted internal investigations.8 6 Al-
though its holding has been expressly adopted in some district
courts,87 Diversified's limited waiver theory is the minority view in the
federal courts of appeals. 88
At least one court has qualified the limited waiver approach. It sug-
gested that a corporation might preserve the right to assert the privi-
lege in subsequent proceedings if, at the time of disclosure, it took
affirmative steps to preserve the privilege.89
ii. Subject-Matter Waiver
The limited waiver approach, which a minority of courts has
adopted, sharply contrasts with the majority rule, which effectively
holds that disclosure to the government encompasses broad subject
matter waiver as to third parties. Courts in the First, 90 Second,9'
Third, 92 Fourth,93 and the D.C. Circuit,94 have adopted broad subject-
85. Id. at 610-11.
86. Id. at 611.
87. See, e.g., Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying Diversi-
fied's limited waiver approach); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368
(E.D. Wis. 1979) (same).
88. Cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Oct. 12, 1995, 78 F.3d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 1996) (owner
and president of a laboratory waived attorney-client privilege as to several specific items of a
marketing plan, but not as to the entire plan).
89. See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n. v. Shamrock Broad. Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 642, 644-45
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that "disclosure to the SEC should be deemed to be a complete waiver
of the attorney-client privilege" in favor of a third party "unless the right to assert the privilege
in subsequent proceedings is specifically reserved at the time the disclosure is made"; court
found broad waiver because party, in response to subpoena, tendered documents to SEC with-
out objection). But see In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d, 1367, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(privilege waived by disclosure to SEC, despite statement in transmittal letter that documents
were confidential and that their submission to the SEC was not a waiver of any privilege).
90. United States v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997) (court found
that university's prior disclosure of its billing and other records to the auditing wing of the U.S.
Department of Defense waived the privilege as to those documents in a subsequent request by
the IRS).
91. See In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that plaintiffs in a
civil suit were entitled to a legal memorandum submitted to the SEC by Steinhardt in an attempt
to forestall enforcement proceedings; because Steinhardt had voluntarily disclosed the memo to
the SEC, the privilege was waived as to third party).
92. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991)
(voluntary disclosure of internal investigation report to the SEC and the Department of Justice
during a bribery investigation waived privilege as to third party).
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matter waiver rules. Each has held, under various formulations, that
disclosure of confidential communications to governmental agencies
constitutes a general broad-based waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege, and thus, such material can be made available to unrelated third
parties. 95
In In re Sealed Case, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that selective disclosure of the results of an internal corpo-
rate investigation to the SEC constituted a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege with respect to the documents withheld.96 In re Sealed
Case involved an outside counsel's internal corporate investigation
into possible illegal foreign payments and illegal political contribu-
tions.97 Counsel submitted a final report to the SEC, along with note-
books containing the lawyers' notes of interviews and certain
corporate records and documents.98 The corporation did not disclose
thirty-eight additional documents that were in the investigative files.99
Subsequently, the grand jury subpoenaed the previously disclosed
documents, as well as those remaining in counsel's investigative
files. 100 The court cited three factors in support of its holding that the
privilege had been waived with respect to the withheld documents: (1)
the corporation's final report to the SEC emphasized that it was based
on a review of all relevant files made available to counsel conducting
the investigation; (2) the corporation had allowed the SEC to access
its files and asserted that all relevant supporting documents were in-
cluded, when in fact two of the documents in question had been re-
moved; and (3) the documents in question were particularly
significant because they impeached the official version of the report
93. See In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988) (disclosure of an internal
report to the U.S. Attorney responding to allegations of fraud waived privilege and thus was
discoverable by an indicted employee for use as a defense against charges arising out of same
allegations).
94. See In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367 (disclosure of final internal investigative
report, underlying records, and lawyer notes to SEC waived privilege and thus could be made
available to plaintiff-shareholders in a subsequent civil action); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (disclosure of an internal investigative report to the SEC waived privilege and
thus could be made available to the Grand Jury in a related matter); Permian Corp. v. United
States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (disclosure of documents to the SEC by company waived
privilege as to these documents and thus were discoverable by the Department of Energy in an
unrelated investigation).
95. See Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681; In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230;
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d 1414; In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619; In re Subpoe-
nas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367; In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793; Permian Corp., 665 F.2d 1214.
96. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 825.
97. Id. at 801-02.
98. Id. at 801-03.
99. Id. at 804, 821.
100. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 804.
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and cast doubt on its veracity.1 " The court further rejected the corpo-
ration's argument that disclosure would discourage voluntary corpo-
rate cooperation with the government; the court stated that the SEC,
or any other government agency, could expressly agree to limitations
on further disclosure consistent with their legal responsibilities. 10 2
Similar to the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, in In re Martin Mari-
etta Corp., held that a corporation's disclosure of privileged material
submitted to the United States Attorney constituted waiver of the cor-
poration's attorney-client privilege, even as to material withheld from
disclosure. 10 3 Martin Marietta had conducted an internal investiga-
tion into alleged fraudulent accounting procedures related to con-
tracts with the Department of Defense.10 4 The company subsequently
disclosed the results of its investigation to the United States Attorney
in a Position Paper describing why the company should not face in-
dictment. 10 5 A former employee indicted for conspiracy to defraud
the Department of Defense sought disclosure, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(C), 10 6 of the corporation's audit papers
and witness statements generated during the investigation. In enforc-
ing the former employee's subpoena, the court rejected the limited
waiver doctrine and held that the privilege had been waived as to the
undisclosed details underlying the published data.10 7 However, the
court afforded greater protection under the work product doctrine
and remanded for a further determination of its applicability. 10 8
There is no clear judicial consensus whether waiver as to third par-
ties encompasses only that material which was disclosed to a govern-
ment agency, or includes all related documents concerning the same
101. Id. at 817-22 (providing a discussion on the ground rules of the SEC's voluntary disclo-
sure program, the express representation regarding the corporation's files, and the significance
of the corporation's files for a fair evaluation).
102. Id. at 824.
103. In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d at 623-24.
104. Id. at 622.
105. ld. at 623.
106. As indicated by its title, this rule governs subpoenas of "Documentary Evidence and of
Objects" and provides:
A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the
books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein. The court on motion
made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasona-
ble or oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects desig-
nated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior
to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production
permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by
the parties and their attorneys.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
107. In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d at 623-24.
108. Id. at 624-27.
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subject matter. The Fourth and D.C. Circuits have extended the
waiver of the attorney-client privilege to include communications not
disclosed, reasoning that the privilege "should be available only at the
traditional price; a litigant who wishes to assert confidentiality must
maintain genuine confidentiality. '" 10 9 Conversely, it has been held
that disclosure of a final investigative report does not result in a
waiver of the attorney-client privilege with respect to the underlying
documentation for the report. 110 In truth, the determination of the
scope of a waiver is nuanced and factual. As the Sixth Circuit ob-
served, the rule that disclosure of some material results in disclosure
of all material on the same subject matter is not determinative, be-
cause "subject matter can be defined narrowly or broadly."'111 "We
are thus persuaded," the court noted, "by the line of cases that try to
make prudential distinctions between what was revealed and what re-
mains privileged. '"112
c. Placing Communications At Issue
Another frequently litigated question is 'at issue' waiver. Asserting
a claim or defense that puts at issue otherwise confidential communi-
cations waives the attorney-client privilege as to those communica-
tions. This waiver issue may arise in a number of contexts.
109. Permian Corp., 665 F.2d at 1222; see also R. J. Hereley & Son Co. v. Stotler & Co., 87
F.R.D. 358, 359 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (discussing how "it is well-settled that voluntary disclosure of a
portion of a privileged communication constitutes a waiver with respect to the rest of the com-
munication on the same subject") (citing Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 453
F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1978)).
110. See Weil v. Inv/Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir. 1981) (find-
ing waiver "only as to communications about the matter actually disclosed"); Schenet v. Ander-
son, 678 F. Supp. 1280, 1284 (E.D. Mich. 1988) ("The privilege is waived only as to those
portions of the preliminary drafts ultimately revealed to third parties."); United States v. Lipshy,
492 F. Supp. 35, 43-44 (N.D. Tex. 1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F.
Supp. 368, 372-73 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (disclosure of independent counsel's report to the SEC, state
grand jury, and IRS did not result in waiver of underlying documentation).
111. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Oct. 12, 1995, 78 F.3d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 1996).
112. Id. at 255-56 (citing inter alia: In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 981 ("remanding district
court decision finding company waived privilege on six documents by inadvertently disclosing
one of the documents because lower court 'did not fully explain why the communications were
related"'); United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 875 n.7 (4th Cir. 1984) ("If any of the
non-privileged documents contain client communications not directly related to the published
data, those communications, if otherwise privileged, must be removed by the reviewing court
before the document may be produced."); United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 145 n.4 (8th Cir.
1972) (requiring in camera review of documents to protect information not already published,
for "[t]oo broad an application of the rule of waiver requiring unlimited disclosure ... might
tend to destroy the salutary purpose of the privilege").
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i. Disclosure of Special Litigation Committee Reports
In response to a shareholder derivative action, a corporation may
engage outside counsel to conduct an internal investigation under the
direction of a special litigation committee.113 In certain circum-
stances, the court may grant the corporation's motion to terminate the
derivative action based upon the report of the special litigation com-
mittee. 114 To the extent a corporation affirmatively relies on the com-
mittee's report, courts may deem the attorney-client privilege waived
and order the report disclosed. 115
ii. Advice-of-Counsel Defense
The attorney-client privilege may also be waived when the client
asserts claims or defenses that put the attorneys' advice at issue in the
litigation.1 6 For example, a party seeking to assert, as a defense
against a claim of willful patent infringement, the fact that they relied
on the advice of counsel, and thus did not act willfully, will be found
to have waived the privilege. 1 7 One widely-cited case in this area
holds that, in order for the privilege to be waived, the waiving party
must take some "affirmative act" to put the protected information at
issue: waiver of the privilege is therefore proper - and disclosure of
the material is appropriate - because concealment would deny the op-
posing party access to information vital to its defense."18 The fact that
a party asserts a defense that will make an attorney's advice relevant
does not waive the privilege. Rather, the advice of counsel "is placed
in issue where the client asserts a claim or defense, and attempts to
prove that claim or defense by disclosing or describing an attorney-
client communication."" 9
113. See generally Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Governance-The Role of Special Litiga-
tion Committees, 68 WASH. L. REV. 79, 86-88 (1993).
114. Id.
115. See In re Perrigo Co., 128 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 1997) (committee report ordered disclosed to
derivative plaintiffs but not to public); In re Cont'l Illinois Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1314 (7th
Cir. 1984) (report ordered disclosed to a newspaper reporting on the litigation); Joy v. North, 692
F.2d 880, 893-94 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983) (holding report and supporting
documentation must be disclosed to shareholders). See generally Jerold S. Solovy & Barry
Levenstam, Special Litigation Committees, 9 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE MATERIALS J. 5 (Apr.
1985).
116. See Garcia v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 58 F.3d 1171, 1175 n.1 (7th Cir. 1995).
117. See, e.g., Soloman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 98 C 7598, 1999 WL 89570, at *2 (N.D.
I11. Feb. 12, 1999) (assertion of advice of counsel defense results in waiver of the attorney-client
privilege and attorney work product protection) (citing cases); Dawson v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 901 F. Supp. 1362, 1369-70 (N.D. I11. 1995) (assertion of advice of counsel defense to claim
to violation of FLSA resulted in waiver of privilege as to certain discovery).
118. See Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
119. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994).
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iii. Reasonable Remedial Acts by Employer Defense
The assertions of a corporation that, in response to allegations of
work-place harassment or discrimination, it has implemented reasona-
ble remedial or compliance programs may, in some cases, constitute
waiver of the attorney-client privilege. This issue arises when the cor-
poration directs its counsel to conduct an internal investigation into
allegations of impropriety, and then, based on the investigative report,
the corporation asserts that it has taken appropriate remedial mea-
sures.120 This issue of waiver through the assertion of reasonable
remediation efforts has become more pronounced in light of recent
Supreme Court holdings where, in cases of supervisor harassment
within Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 121 the employer may
escape liability if it can show: (1) it exercised reasonable care to pre-
vent and promptly correct the supervisor's sexual harassment and (2)
the victim unreasonably failed to take advantage of any corrective or
preventive opportunities, that the employer provided, or to otherwise
avoid harm.122 Thus, the corporation may find itself defending against
waiver of privilege arguments to the extent it bases its "reasonable
response" defense on an attorney-directed internal investigation.
When such an internal investigation is used to affirmatively plead this
defense, "the adequacy of the employer's investigation becomes criti-
cal to the issue of liability."'1 23 Thus, the only way the plaintiff "can
determine the reasonableness of the [employer's] investigation is
through full disclosure of the [report's] contents."'1 24 One court has
held that both the attorney-client privilege and the work product doc-
trine were waived where the employer, based in part on an outside
counsel's report, asserted the affirmative defense that it took effective
remedial action and that the plaintiff's alleged conduct was
welcomed. 125
120. See, e.g., McGrath v. Nassau County Health Care Corp., 204 F.R.D. 240, 245-46
(E.D.N.Y. 2001).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq.
122. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998). This defense, available to employers in the employment con-
text, is sometimes referred to as the "Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense." See, e.g., Todd v.
Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1999).
123. Brownell v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 19, 25 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
124. McGrath, 204 F.R.D. at 248 (outside counsel's internal investigative report into allega-
tions of sexual harassment supported employer's affirmative defense that it exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct sexual harassment; such reliance waived attorney-client privilege and
report ordered disclosed to plaintiff).
125. See Worthington v. Endee, 177 F.R.D. 113, 118 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
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d. Crime - Fraud Waiver
The attorney-client privilege will not apply where legal advice has
been obtained in furtherance of an illegal or fraudulent act.12 6 To es-
tablish the crime - fraud exception, the party that is seeking discovery
need only establish a prima facie showing that the advice was obtained
in furtherance of an illegal or fraudulent act. 127 The party need not
show that a crime or fraud occurred; it is sufficient that a crime or
fraud was the objective of the communication. 128 A party that is seek-
ing discovery must come forward with at least some evidence that, if
believed, would establish the elements of an ongoing or imminent
crime or fraud. 129 However, an attorney's ignorance of his client's
purpose is irrelevant. 130
B. Work Product Doctrine
In addition to the attorney-client privilege and to a limited extent,
the self-evaluation privilege, the work product doctrine also protects
the confidentiality of materials related to an internal corporate inves-
tigation. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), codifying the work
product doctrine as enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor,131 defines the
elements of the work product doctrine in the federal courts. 32 In rel-
evant part, Rule 26(b)(3) states that:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things
otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party
or by or for that other party's representative (including the other
party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent)
only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial
need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that
the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of
such materials when the required showing has been made, the court
shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclu-
126. In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 162 (6th Cir. 1986); see also In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 773 F.2d 204, 206 (8th Cir. 1985).
127. In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir 1985).
128. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 18, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d
Cir. 1984).
129. In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d at 399; see also In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155
(requiring a showing of probable cause).
130. In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d at 402; United States v. Horvath, 731 F.2d 557, 562 (8th Cir.
1984).
131. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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sions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representa-
tive of a party concerning the litigation.133
Thus, the work product doctrine, which applies equally in criminal
prosecutions, 134 shields: (1) documents or tangible things prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial; (2) by or for another party or that
party's representative; (3) unless the party seeking discovery demon-
strates both substantial need for those materials and it is unable, with-
out undue hardship, to obtain the equivalent of those materials. 135
Similar to the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine will
not prevent an adversary from obtaining information from a witness
or independent source simply because that information was disclosed
earlier to counsel, or is contained in a document not otherwise
discoverable. 136
The purpose behind the work product doctrine is to "preserve a
zone of privacy in which a lawyer can prepare and develop legal theo-
ries and strategy with an eye toward litigation, free from unnecessary
intrusion by his adversaries.' 37 The Hickman court explained that,
without protection for a lawyer's work product, "much of what is now
put down in writing would remain unwritten," undermining the effi-
ciency, fairness, and sharpness of the adversarial system. 38
In structuring an internal corporate investigation, counsel must con-
sider from the outset both the policy and the requirements underlying
the work product doctrine in order to more effectively utilize its pro-
tections. The three elements to the work product doctrine are ex-
amined below.
1. Anticipation of Litigation
In order for the work product protections to attach, materials must
have been prepared in anticipation of litigation, even if the litigation
concerns an unrelated matter. 39 Materials prepared with only a re-
133. Id.
134. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236 (1975); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(2).
135. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
136. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note (stating that "No change is made
in the existing doctrine, noted in the Hickman case, that one party may discover relevant facts
known or available to the other party, even though such facts are contained in a document which
is not itself discoverable.").
137. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at
510-11); see also In re Foster, 188 F.3d 1259, 1272 (10th Cir. 1999).
138. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 393-94.
139. See, e.g., In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 335 (8th Cir. 1977); Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et
Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480, 484-85 & n.15 (4th Cir. 1973); Panter v. Marshall Field &
Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 724 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct., 452,
457 (1987). In some jurisdictions, this is still an outstanding issue. See In re Grand Jury Proceed-
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mote possibility of, or mere speculation as to, future litigation gener-
ally will not be protected.1 40 The question whether documents were
so prepared is inherently a factual question, and the courts will look to
see that the materials were prepared "because of" a litigation need (in
which case materials would be protected), and not merely prepared as
part of the normal course of a corporation's business (in which case
materials would be without protection). 141 A leading treatise suc-
cinctly put it:
The test should be whether, in light of the nature of the document
and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can
fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the
prospect of litigation. But the converse of this is that even though
litigation is already in prospect, there is no work product immunity
for documents prepared in the regular course of business rather
than for purposes of litigation. 142
Courts construe this requirement strictly, as one court put it:
[The] mere fact that litigation does eventually ensue does not, by
itself, cloak materials with the work product privilege; the privilege
is not that broad. Rather, we look to whether in light of the factual
context the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or
obtained because of the prospect of litigation.143
Therefore, it is critical that corporate counsel document the legal na-
ture of his or her involvement in the investigation. To the extent the
court views counsel's involvement in an investigation as business -
and not legal - in nature, the materials that counsel has generated risk
losing the protection of the work product doctrine. 144
ings, 604 F.2d 798, 803-04 (3d Cir. 1979) (while observing that work product doctrine should only
apply to closely related subsequent litigation, the court declined to expressly so hold); see also In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 43 F.3d 966, 971 (5th Cir. 1994) (recognizing two approaches-i.e.,
applying the doctrine to subsequent related or unrelated litigation-and refusing to choose be-
tween the two).
140. See In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 65 (7th Cir. 1980).
141. See, e.g., Broadnax v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 180 F.R.D. 343, 346 (N.D. I11. 1998) (expres-
sing the work product doctrine in terms of "causation": "production of the materials must be
caused by the anticipation of litigation. If materials are produced in the ordinary and regular
course of a discovery opponent's business, and not to prepare for litigation, they are outside the
scope of the work product doctrine.") (internal citations omitted).
142. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024, at 198-99
(1970) (footnotes omitted).
143. Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 976-77 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal cita-
tions, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted).
144. See Logan, 96 F.3d at 977 (investigative materials prepared "in the ordinary course of
business as a precaution for the 'remote prospect of litigation"' are not protected, while "materi-
als prepared because [of] 'some articulable claim, likely to lead to litigation"' are protected)
(citation omitted); see also Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 917 (1987) (risk management documents and the aggregate case reserve infor-
mation contained therein were not prepared for the purposes of litigation; such documents were
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Although it is not always easy to determine whether the "anticipa-
tion of litigation" requirement has been met, it has been held that in
the context of a regulatory agency's investigations, there exists not just
the "mere possibility of future litigation," but "reasonable grounds for
anticipating litigation."'1 45 Thus, where corporate investigations are
conducted to specifically address allegations of corporate misconduct,
courts seem more willing to construe materials generated from the
investigative process as predicates to litigation, even though litigation
may not ultimately ensue.
The more serious the allegations, the greater the likelihood that liti-
gation will result, and the more likely a court will find materials gener-
ated therein as being protected under the work product doctrine. In
In re Grand Jury Investigation, the investigation concerned possible
criminal wrongdoing. In ruling that the work product doctrine ap-
plied, the Third Circuit observed that in the context of the ongoing
criminal investigation, "litigation of some sort [is] almost inevitable.
The most obvious possibilities include criminal prosecutions, deriva-
tive suits, securities litigation, or even litigation by Sun to recover the
illegal payments."'1 46 The court distinguished other cases that dealt
with the discoverability of internal IRS memoranda prepared during
the investigative and settlement phases of a tax audit - situations
where litigation was not very likely.147 Some courts have refused to
find that investigative materials were generated in anticipation of liti-
gation, even though the investigation could have resulted in litiga-
tion. 48 However, as the preceding discussion suggests, material
"business planning documents," and did "not enhance[ ] the defense of any particular lawsuit");
Disidore v. Mail Contractors of Am., Inc., 196 F.R.D. 410, 414 (D. Kan. 2000) (although insur-
ance company hired attorney to conduct claims investigation, it failed to prove that investigative
materials were generated in anticipation of a lawsuit).
145. Garrett v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 95 CIV.2406, 1996 WL 325725, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June
12, 1996); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 511 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1979) (investiga-
tion of possible illegal foreign payments); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d
Cir. 1979) (same); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 612 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (investigation in
response to an SEC subpoena); United States v. Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35, 44-45 (N.D. Tex. 1979)
(in-house investigation of political payments); cf Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399
(1981) (government conceded applicability of the work product doctrine to documents prepared
in the course of an internal corporate investigation). But see Litton Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 27
Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (court held that interview memoranda from in-
house counsel's investigation of suspected bribes and unfounded "finder's fees" in the corpora-
tion's sales department only presented a "'remote possibility' of litigation" and therefore no
work product immunity attached).
146. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d at 1229.
147. Id.
148. See Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1978) ("Law Firm's work
was not done in preparation for any trial, and we do not think that the work was done in 'antici-
pation of litigation,' as that term is used in Rule 26(b)(3), although, of course, all parties con-
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generated during the course of an internal investigation - so long as
that material is produced because of, or with an eye toward, litigation
- will be protected under the work product doctrine.
2. Documents Prepared By A Party, His Attorney, Or
His Representative
The work product doctrine protects materials that others, besides
counsel, have prepared at counsel's request.149 As a result, non-attor-
neys may be involved in the creation of protected work product. As
the advisory committee notes to Rule 26(b)(3) make clear, the work
product doctrine extends "not merely as to materials prepared by an
attorney, but also as to materials prepared in anticipation of litigation
or preparation for trial by or for a party or any representative acting
on his behalf. 1 50 There are some cases that have limited the work
product protection to materials prepared by, or at the direction of, an
attorney.' 5 ' However, the clear trend, consistent with the language
and intent of Rule 26(b)(3), is that materials need not have been pre-
pared by, or under the direction of, counsel in order to constitute
work-product.' 52
3. Substantial Need and Undue Hardship
The work product doctrine provides only a qualified protection of
confidentiality: if the party requesting the material has a substantial
need for the information and cannot obtain the substantial equivalent
without undue hardship, a court can order disclosure of the mate-
cerned must have been aware that the conduct of employees of Diversified in years past might
ultimately result in litigation of some sort in the future."); see also In re Kidder Peabody Sec.
Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459, 465-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (notes and memoranda of interviews conducted
by outside counsel during a much publicized SEC investigation were not created "principally"
for litigation, but as a business and public relations strategy).
149. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 239 n.13; FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory
committee's note; In re Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1982)
(protecting as privileged communications between auditors and attorneys).
150. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note to 1970 amendments.
151. See, e.g., In re Six Grand Jury Witnesses, 979 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1992) (work-product im-
munity does not protect information concerning analyses prepared by employees at the direction
of corporation counsel, although it protects communications to counsel about those analyses);
Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367, 372 (N.D. I11. 1972) (in order
to be work-product, materials must have been authored after consultation with attorney); see
also United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 995 F. Supp. 1460 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (materials
relating to internal audit performed by in-house auditor after issues arose concerning accounting
on government contract were not protected as work product).
152. See APL Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 91 F.R.D. 10 (D. Md. 1980) (to the extent
documents are assembled by or for a party or his representatives into a meaningful product, the
contents of that assemblage is work-product sheltered from disclosure).
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rial.153 However, the law, consistent with Hickman and Rule 26(b)(3),
recognizes a distinction between materials that do not reveal any of
the attorney's mental processes ("ordinary work product") and mater-
ials that reveal the opinions, conclusions, and mental impressions of
the attorney ("opinion work product"). 154 Recorded witness state-
ments are examples of ordinary work product; an attorney's notes of
an oral interview or a memorandum analyzing the situation are exam-
ples of opinion work product. For policy reasons, opinion work prod-
uct receives greater protection from disclosure than ordinary work
product.1 55
a. Ordinary Work Product
With regard to ordinary work product, courts have reached varied
conclusions when interpreting the substantial need and undue hard-
ship requirements. 156 A review of these decisions reveals that the de-
termination of need and undue hardship depends largely on the facts
in each case. Relevant circumstances include: (1) the nature of the
materials requested; (2) the effort involved in composing or assem-
bling the materials; (3) the potential for alternate sources of informa-
tion; (4) the importance of the materials in relation to the issues at
hand; and (5) the procedural posture in which the claim arises.' 57
From the perspective of counsel conducting an internal corporate in-
vestigation, these factors introduce uncertainties with regard to the
applicability of the work product doctrine.
b. Opinion Work Product
In contrast to the protection accorded ordinary work product, opin-
ion work product is discoverable, if at all, only upon a showing of
153. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
154. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399-402 (1981); Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 511-13 (1947); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 512-13 (2d Cir. 1979).
155. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401.
156. See, e.g., In re Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1240 (5th Cir. 1982)
(witness' present lack of recollection sufficient to establish substantial need); United States
Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 988 (3d Cir. 1980) (avoidance of time and effort held suffi-
cient to justify disclosure of a list of interviewees during internal investigation); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 512 (2d Cir. 1979) (government's desire to examine questionnaires and
interview memoranda in order to decide whether to offer immunity did not constitute sufficient
need); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 725 (N.D. I11. 1978) (death of witness held
sufficient to require immunity did not constitute sufficient need); Panter, 80 F.R.D. at 725 (death
of witness held sufficient to require production of work product); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
73 F.R.D. 647, 653-54 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (citing grand jury's authority and need to investigate,
court held that materials prepared in anticipation of prior litigation must be produced in re-
sponse to grand jury subpoena).
157. See supra note 156.
[Vol. 1:49
CORPORATE INVESTIGATION
extraordinary need. Although the Supreme Court in Upjohn declined
to decide whether opinion work product should receive absolute pro-
tection from disclosure, 158 the current trend is to view opinion work
product as absolutely protected, barring "very rare and extraordinary
circumstances,"' 159 such as when the attorney has engaged in illegal
conduct or fraud.160
4. Waiver of Work Product Protection
Due to the differences in purpose between the attorney-client privi-
lege and the work product doctrine, the standards for their waiver dif-
fer slightly. Therefore, an analysis of waiver of work product must be
made with reference to the doctrine's underlying purpose, which is to
protect material from an adversary in litigation. In light of this pur-
pose, disclosure to a third party will not waive the work product privi-
lege, "unless such disclosure, under the circumstances, is inconsistent
with the maintenance of secrecy from the disclosing party's adver-
sary.' 16 ' Waiver of work product will occur to the extent disclosure
"substantially increases" the possibility of an opposing party obtaining
the information. 62 Thus, disclosures to non-adversaries made in the
course of trial preparation should be allowed without waiver of the
privilege. In other words, "while the mere showing of a voluntary dis-
closure to a third person will generally suffice to show waiver of the
attorney-client privilege, it should not suffice in itself for waiver of the
work product privilege.' 63
158. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401.
159. Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 403 (4th Cir. 1999); Williamson v. Moore, 221 F.3d
1177, 1182 (11th Cir. 2000); Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 209 F.3d 1051, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000);
Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985); In re Int'l Sys. &
Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F. 2d 1235, 1240 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793,
809-10 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 412 F. Supp. 943, 949 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (opinion work product unqualifiedly and absolutely protected from disclosure).
160. GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 85 F.R.D. 46, 51-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (citing 8 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2024, at 198-99 (1970)); see also
Minnesota Sch. Bds. Ass'n Ins. Trust v. Employers Ins. Co., 183 F.R.D. 627, 631 (N.D. Il. 1999)
("A waiver only occurs, however, if the disclosure to a third party is inconsistent with the main-
tenance of secrecy from the disclosing party's adversary.") (citation and internal quotations
omitted).
161. GAF Corp., 85 F.R.D. at 52; see also Behnia v. Shapiro, 176 F.R.D. 277, 279 (N.D. Ill.
1997).
162. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also
In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 809 ("The work product privilege protects both the attorney-client
relationship and a complex of individual interests particular to attorneys that their clients may
not share. And because it looks to the vitality of the adversary system rather than simply seek-
ing to preserve confidentiality, the work product privilege is not automatically waived by any
disclosure to a third party.").
163. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d at 1299.
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In general, no waiver will result if information is shared with an-
other party who possesses a "common interest" - one who anticipates
litigation against a common adversary on the same issue or issues.164
In cases where work product is shared with, or disclosed to, a party
with a "common interest," waiver of work product has not been
found. 165 The same waiver analysis applies in the context of work
product disclosures to governmental agencies. In Permian Corp. v.
U.S., a case involving the transfer of work product to the SEC pursu-
ant to an inquiry into the adequacy of a company's registration state-
ment for a proposed share exchange, the court affirmed the district
court in finding no waiver as to certain documents. 166 The Permian
court held that, under the circumstances, the disclosure to the SEC
was not adversarial, but was done pursuant to a confidentiality agree-
ment to assist the SEC with its review. 167 By contrast, waiver was
found in In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, where disclosure of docu-
ments to the SEC was to persuade the SEC not to engage in a formal
investigation of possible wrongdoings. 168
In addition to disclosures to adversaries, the protections of the work
product doctrine also may be waived through the testimonial use of
work product documents during a deposition, 169 or during trial. 170
When waiver of work product protection is found, courts must de-
cide on the scope of the waiver. Unlike waiver of the attorney-client
privilege, which often results in the waiver of all communications on
164. See Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 744 F.2d 1464, 1466 (11th Cir. 1984); In re Circle K
Corp., Nos. 96 CIV.5801 (JFK), 96 CIV.6479 (JFK), 1997 WL 31197, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28,
1997).
165. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1217-20 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
166. Id. at 1214.
167. In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1372-73 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("There is no
question that the SEC was an adversary to Tesoro. This was not a partnership between allies.
Tesoro was not simply assisting the SEC in doing its job. Rather, Tesoro independently and
voluntarily chose to participate in a thorough disclosure program, in return for which it received
the quid pro quo of lenient punishment for any wrongdoings exposed in the process. That deci-
sion was obviously motivated by self-interest." Id. at 1372.).
168. See James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 146 (D. Del. 1982) ("The binder at
issue contains various documents selected and arranged by plaintiff's counsel and given to vari-
ous witnesses prior to their depositions. Without reviewing those binders defendants' counsel
cannot know or inquire into the extent to which the witnesses testimony has been shaded by
counsel's presentation of the factual background.... Plaintiff's counsel made a decision to edu-
cate their witnesses by supplying them with the binders, and the Raytheon defendants are enti-
tled to know the content of that education.").
169. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236-40 (1970); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Universal
City Studios, 110 F.R.D. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
170. As the court in Martin Marietta Corp. observed, broad, subject-matter waiver does not
extend to materials protected by opinion work product. Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619,
625-26 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Cox v. Adm'r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1422-23 (11th
Cir. 1994) (same).
CORPORATE INVESTIGATION
the same subject matter, waiver of work product material is generally
limited to those documents that are actually disclosed. 171 However,
some courts, invoking fairness principles, have found waiver not only
with regards to disclosed materials, but also to undisclosed related
materials. 172
5. Crime-Fraud Exception
Similar to the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege,
no protection of confidentiality is accorded to work product com-
pleted in furtherance of a crime or fraud. 73 However, unlike the
waiver rule applied to the attorney-client privilege, an attorney's
knowledge of the crime or fraud is relevant in the context of work
product protection. 74 Thus, if the attorney is ignorant of the crime or
fraud, work product protection is waived only as to information fur-
nished to the attorney and not as to his mental impressions, conclu-
sions, opinions or legal theories. 75
III. ANALYSIS
In light of the myriad and often conflicting decisional law of the
federal courts, corporations must possess a thorough understanding of
both attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine to more ef-
fectively facilitate internal investigations. To this end, Part A exam-
ines the interrelationship between these two doctrines. Part B
clarifies the importance of confidentiality in the corporate
environment.
A. The Interrelationship Between the Attorney-Client Privilege and
Work Product Doctrine
In order to take full advantage of the protections of the attorney-
client privilege and the work product doctrine, counsel conducting an
internal corporate investigation must be aware of their respective un-
derlying rationales. The attorney-client privilege exists to protect the
171. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 818 (broad subject matter waiver found where "accept-
able tactics ... degenerate[d] into 'sharp practices' inimical to a healthy adversary system"); see
also Gen. Foods Corp. v. Nestle Co., 218 U.S. P.Q. 812, 815 (D.N.J. 1982).
172. See In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 162-64 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Sealed Case,
676 F.2d at 811-13; In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 492 (2d Cir. 1982).
173. See In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d at 164; In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (II),
640 F.2d 49, 63 (7th Cir. 1980).
174. See In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d at 164; In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (II),
640 F.2d at 62-63.
175. See In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d at 164; In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (II),
640 F.2d at 63.
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confidentiality of communications between client and counsel; it is de-
signed to encourage the full and candid disclosure of relevant infor-
mation. 176 In contrast, the work product doctrine promotes the
adversarial nature of our justice system by safeguarding the fruits of
an attorney's trial preparation from the discovery attempts of his/her
opponents.177 The purpose of the work product doctrine is to protect
information from disclosure to opposing parties, rather than to all
others outside a particular confidential relationship. 78
In accordance with these underlying objectives, the attorney-client
privilege affords absolute protection against disclosure of confidential
communications between a client and his/her attorney, while the work
product doctrine provides only a qualified protection to the fruits of
an attorney's efforts with regard to all aspects of a given case, even
those outside the scope of confidential client communications. 179
Stated more simply, the attorney-client privilege provides absolute
protection for a limited class of communications; the work product
doctrine provides qualified protection to a potentially broader class of
communications and documents. 180
If one possesses an understanding of the doctrines' slightly different
rationales, it is possible to better appreciate the case law that may, at
the same time, uphold one doctrine and reject the other. For example,
a corporation may lose on a privilege claim but win on work product,
or vice versa. In In re Martin Marietta Corp., the court held that, de-
spite waiver of the attorney-client privilege, the corporation's decision
to disclose the results of an internal investigation to the government
did not constitute waiver of the protection for opinion work prod-
uct.181 In Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Indus., Inc.,182 the
defendant corporation lost on its ordinary work product argument,
and was forced to turn over the factual findings of an investigation.
However, the corporation prevailed with respect to attorney-client
privilege and opinion work product materials, namely employee inter-
views and counsel's written legal conclusions. 83
To the extent state law bears on the matter, such as those instances
when a federal court, sitting in diversity, must apply state law to attor-
176. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1298-99 (noting that the purpose of the work product doctrine is to "protect mate-
rial from an opposing party in litigation, not necessarily from the rest of the world generally").
179. Id.
180. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 808-09, 812 n.72 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
181. In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1988).
182. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Indus., 553 F. Supp. 45, 50-51 (S.D. N.Y. 1982).
183. Id. at 51.
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ney-client disputes, judicial outcomes can be equally perplexing. In
Connolly Data Sys. v. Victor Technologies, Inc.,184 the court held that
the attorney-client privilege, under California law, did not apply to
communications with a corporate client's former employee. At the
same time, the court held that, under Federal Rule 26(b)(3), these
communications were protected from disclosure under the work prod-
uct doctrine. 185 In dicta, the court noted that if federal law had ap-
plied to the attorney-client issue, the communications with former
employees would have been protected under governing Ninth Circuit
law.186
In order to come within the requirements of both principles, coun-
sel conducting an internal corporate investigation must consider the
interrelationship between the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine when communicating with clients and others. Such a
strategy will place the client-corporation in a far more favorable posi-
tion should it decide to resist subsequent requests for disclosure. It is
therefore essential that corporate counsel become actively involved in
structuring and overseeing the internal corporate investigation at the
earliest possible stage, as well as directing the method and progress of
such investigation, with an eye toward keeping sensitive materials pro-
tected. Specific strategies are described infra at Section IV.
B. Importance of Confidentiality
As part of its internal corporate investigation, counsel may conduct
many employee interviews. Although these communications may be
protected under the attorney-client privilege or the work product doc-
trine, they have the potential to undermine the confidentiality of the
investigation in several ways. First, disclosure to lower or mid-level
employees of confidential information gathered during the investiga-
tion may be construed as a breach in confidentiality, unless the disclo-
sure is necessary to convey or implement legal advice. 87
Second, although most employees may not be authorized to waive
the corporation's attorney-client privilege, 188 an employee may de-
184. Connolly Data Sys., Inc. v. Victor Techs., Inc., 114 F.R.D. 89 (S.D. Cal. 1987).
185. Id. at 95.
186. Had federal law applied to the attorney-client dispute, In re Coordinated Pretrial Pro-
ceedings, 658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir, 1981) would have rendered the communications privileged.
187. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 n.5 (1981) (responses to question-
naires and notes of interviews not disclosed to anyone except general counsel and outside
counsel).
188. See generally Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348
(1985).
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cide, for whatever reason, to disclose to a third party the subject mat-
ter of communications obtained from counsel.
Counsel can address these potential problems through specific in-
structions that outline the importance of maintaining the confidential-
ity of communications pertinent to the internal investigation. In
addition, counsel must limit his or her own disclosures of confidential
information within the corporation to those upper-level management
and directors who need the information for decision-making purposes.
Instructions given to employees concerning the need to maintain
confidentiality implicate many potential ethical issues. Counsel for
the corporation owes an allegiance to the corporation as an entity,
rather than to any individual employee. 189 In many circumstances, the
interests of individual employees may be adverse to the interests of
the corporation, and if the corporation decides to waive the protec-
tions of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, it
may be to the employee's detriment. As a result, it is not difficult to
imagine a situation where the corporation, in an effort to minimize
exposure to liability, will move against one of its employees, where an
investigation suggests culpable conduct on the employee's part.
In the interests of candor, 190 counsel should instruct employees that
he/she represents the corporation, that he/she is not their attorney,
that employees cannot, on their own, assert the attorney-client privi-
lege to bar disclosure of the contents of an interview,19' and that the
corporation possesses the attorney-client privilege, but may waive it
and disclose the information, to the detriment of the employee. 192 To
the extent the employee agrees to be interviewed, counsel, to its bene-
fit, may avoid any conflict-of-interest problems that might otherwise
result from the seemingly joint representation of both the corporation
and employee. 193
189. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1980) (lawyer's allegiance to
corporate client is to the entity rather than stockholder, director, officer, employee, representa-
tive, etc.); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2002) (lawyer represents organiza-
tion acting through its duly authorized constituents); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.13(a) cmt. n.1 (2002) ("An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except
through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents.").
190. See, e.g., W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1976) (court disapproved of
counsel's lack of candor in interviewing employee without informing him that corporation had
him as a defendant in a lawsuit filed the same day as him that corporation had named him as a
defendant in a lawsuit filed the same day as the interview).
191. See United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 699-701 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1183 (1986).
192. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. n.7 (2002).
193. See In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1976); In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-
30557, 575 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ga. 1983); United States v. RMI Co., 467 F. Supp. 915 (M.D. Pa.
1979); see also Block & Remz, After Upjohn: The Uncertain Confidentiality of Corporate Investi-
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Fact-finding is a primary goal of any investigation, therefore an em-
ployee with relevant information is important to that effort. Thus, any
corporate-type Miranda warning given to an employee must not be
overstated, such that the employee refuses to offer any information.
Corporate counsel must recognize the importance of confidentiality
and the parameters of both the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine from the outset of an internal investigation. This
outline is not meant to provide exhaustive research for litigation of
these issues, but serves to advise counsel of the relevant concerns, so
that these issues can be considered from the outset. Adherence to
these general recommendations, along with the exercise of caution in
areas of uncertainty, should place the corporation in the best possible
position if these issues are subsequently litigated.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has highlighted certain of the privileges accorded to law-
yers that arise within the context of internal corporate investigations.
The article examined the underpinnings and characteristics of the at-
torney-client privilege, and explored the impact of Upjohn in the con-
text of internal investigations. Mention was made of the corporate
self-evaluation privilege, which, although not widely recognized by the
courts, may still represent a valid privilege in some jurisdictions. Fi-
nally, the contours of the work product doctrine were analyzed, with
an eye to the circumstances under which the doctrine can be properly
invoked, and waived, during an investigation.
Given the spate of recent corporate debacles from Enron Corp. to
Arthur Andersen, internal corporate investigations have taken on in-
creased importance. Regardless of the political and financial climate,
however, corporate counsel must always be vigilant of its role as advo-
cate of the corporate entity during an investigation. The end product
of counsel's work should reflect fidelity to the corporation and re-
sponsiveness to the standards of public accountability. Striking this
balance is critical.
Ideally, business decisions should reinforce legal decisions concern-
ing the content and course of an investigation. Although the former is
beyond the scope of this article, we do offer a limited set of practical
recommendations that corporate counsel may take as they initiate,
conduct, and conclude internal corporate investigations. Accordingly,
gative Files, reprinted in Corporate Disclosure and Attorney-Client Privilege (ABA-PLI) 75 n.39
(1984) (suggesting that Miranda-like warnings be given to employees interviewed during an in-
ternal corporate investigation).
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the balance of this Conclusion is devoted to practical steps that corpo-
rate counsel should consider during the investigation process. Imple-
menting these measures will help counsel not only fulfill its role as
advocate to a corporate client, but also take advantage of the legal
privileges that inhere in its position as an attorney.
A. Internal Investigations Procedures
1. Initiating the Investigation
a. Early Lawyer Involvement
Management should promptly notify the board of directors of any
improprieties, so that counsel can be engaged from the outset of the
investigation. If management conducts the preliminary investigation,
without the involvement of counsel, it may not receive the benefits of
the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine.194 The corpo-
ration may want to consider engaging outside counsel, in order to un-
derscore the legal nature of the investigation.
b. Corporation Should Make Explicit Request for Legal Advice
Senior officers of the corporation should make an explicit request
for counsel to provide legal, rather than business, advice. Specifically,
the request should refer to a legal examination, rather than a purely
factual inquiry, meaning the corporation intends the investigation to
culminate in legal advice, either in the form of a recommendation for
the future, or analysis of past conduct or activities. If outside counsel
is hired, such a request should be included in the retention letter; if in-
house counsel is involved, a memorandum to the same effect should
be sent to all the necessary parties.
2. Counsel's Responsibilities
a. Document the Confidentiality of Communications
Counsel must ensure that the confidentiality of the communications
with the client is well documented, because the party asserting a claim
of privilege bears the burden of proof to establish the necessary ele-
ments in support of the privilege. 195 Moreover, because confidential-
ity and waiver concerns can arise due to the number of agents of the
194. See Block & Barton, Internal Corporate Investigations: Maintaining the Confidentiality of
a Corporate Client's Communications with Investigative Counsel, 35 Bus. LAw. 5, 9 (1979) (advis-
ing early briefing of board of directors and prompt retention of counsel when management re-
ceives evidence of impropriety).
195. See United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928, 938 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978);
In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 600 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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corporation and counsel involved in an investigation, counsel must as-
sume primary responsibility for maintaining confidentiality and docu-
menting those efforts. Memoranda or notes of interviews should
indicate who was present and all documents generated should be la-
beled privileged and confidential.
b. Restrict the Internal Flow of Information
Counsel can demonstrate intended confidentiality of communica-
tions in several ways: (1) restricting dissemination within the corpora-
tion; (2) delivering reports from non-lawyers directly to counsel,
rather than using intermediaries; and (3) maintaining files and docu-
mentation apart from general corporate files.
c. Get Information From Highest Possible Sources
In light of the limited reach of Upjohn, information should be ob-
tained from the highest possible management source that is available.
Although Upjohn rejected the notion that only upper management
(i.e., the "control group") can receive the protections of the attorney-
client privilege, Upjohn did not, and could not, govern state court de-
cisions, many of which continue to apply the control group principles
when deciding attorney-client issues. As a result, some state courts
will only extend the protections of the attorney-client privilege to up-
per-echelon ("control group") management, and any confidential
communications from lower-level employees will not be protected.
Thus, counsel should seek to obtain information from the highest pos-
sible sources within the organization, and follow up with lower-level
employees only if absolutely necessary.
d. Label Documents Judiciously
Where third parties have gathered information, counsel should
clearly and explicitly (by requests, acknowledgement of receipt, etc.)
indicate that the material is being gathered for the purposes of render-
ing legal advice "in anticipation of litigation." It is to be noted that
excessive marking of documents may weaken the privilege for the sen-
sitive documents that need the protection most. Therefore, to the ex-
tent possible, counsel should only mark as confidential, privileged, or
legal in nature, those documents that actually deserve such a
designation.
e. Interpose Legal Conclusions
Counsel should strive to include mental impressions, legal theories
or potential strategies in all notes or memoranda of interviews with
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others, in order to afford those documents the extensive protection of
opinion work product.
f. Treat Former Employee Contacts as Confidential
When communicating with former employees, counsel should main-
tain his/her notes in a manner that is designed to maximize the protec-
tions of the work product doctrine and advise the former employee of
the confidential nature of the investigation, in order to discourage dis-
closure of the information to others.
3. Concluding the Investigation
a. Decision Whether to Release Report to Government
Counsel must carefully evaluate the impact on attorney-client privi-
lege and work product protection before disclosing the report, or the
results of the investigation, to a governmental agency, underwriter's
counsel, accountants, or the press.
b. Legal Conclusions to the Board
Counsel should include express legal conclusions, opinions, and rec-
ommendations in the report to the board of directors. 196
196. See Block & Barton, supra note 194, at 11.
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